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INTRODUCTION
Thank you Chairman Skelton, Representative Hunter, and members of
the House Armed Services Committee for inviting me to speak to you today.
I appreciate the time and attention that your Committee is devoting to the
legal and human rights crisis surrounding the detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
On November 28, 2001, I testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee about the President’s then two-week-old plan to try suspected
terrorists before ad hoc military commissions. I warned the Committee that
our Constitution precluded the President from unilaterally establishing
military tribunals and that the structural provisions employed by our
Founders required these tribunals to be set up by Congress. On June 29,
2006, the Supreme Court agreed in a case I argued, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The Hamdan decision invalidated the makeshift
tribunal scheme devised by presidential fiat alone.
Indeed, every time the Supreme Court has ruled on the merits
regarding the Executive Branch’s procedures for detainees, it has found
them lacking, forcing Congress and the Executive back to the drawing board
at great expense to the nation in terms of money, time, and the trust of the
American people. The latest event occurred last month, when the Supreme
Court struck down a key part of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(“MCA”) in Boumediene v. Bush.

The basic question I am here to answer today is: What changed after
Boumediene v. Bush? The simple answer is: Everything. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Boumediene profoundly affects the detainees currently
held at Guantanamo Bay and the Military Commission system established to
try many of them for war crimes. The case marked the fourth time in as
many years that the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempts to
defend its Guantanamo Bay policy. A clear pattern has emerged. Each
subsequent decision has further chipped away at the foundation of that
policy. Despite the familiar result, Boumediene nevertheless was unique, as
it was the first Guantanamo-related case the Court heard after Congress
passed the MCA. The Court invalidated part of that law as unconstitutional,
in the process emphasizing that the Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay.
As a result, it is now clear that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have a
constitutionally-protected right to have an Article III court review the
legality of their detention in a habeas corpus action. The practical
implications of the case do not end there. The Court’s holding in
Bouemediene did more than invalidate a single section of the MCA; it
stripped away the veneer to expose the eroding foundation of the military
commission system.
In this testimony, I will make four points: (1) the Boumediene
decision has called into question the foundational assumption on which the
MCA is based, that the Constitution and treaties of the United States do not
protect detainees at Guantanamo Bay; (2) the MCA unconstitutionally
discriminates against noncitizens; (3) Congress, after careful deliberation,
should take up legislation to follow Boumediene and balance national
security and civil liberties concerns; and (4) legislation should make clear
that the military commission process is no substitute for the Great Writ of
habeas corpus.
The Constitution Now Applies to Guantanamo Bay
The MCA was enacted as a direct response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1 The Court in that case held that the
1

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Hamdan is to face a military commission
newly designed, because of his efforts, by a Congress that finally stepped up to its responsibility, acting
according to guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court [in the earlier Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision,
available at 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)]”).
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President did not have the authority to try detainees by military commission
without specific Congressional authorization, and that the system established
by the President violated the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. The
main goal of the MCA was to establish military commissions at Guantanamo
in which the Government could try detainees charged with war crimes. It is
evident that the MCA reflected two fundamental beliefs about the rule of
law and Guantanamo: (1) that the Constitution did not apply there; and (2)
that international treaties had no force there. Boumediene eviscerated the
first belief and the second is bound to suffer the same fate.
In the myriad cases challenging its detention methods, the
Government consistently argued that fundamental provisions of the U.S.
Constitution did not apply in Guantanamo because the U.S. lacked de jure
sovereignty there. Accordingly, the Government’s view was that the
Constitution did not constrain its detention policy. This was a troubling
assertion, but such a view was not limited to the Executive branch; the
prevailing view by Congress’ MCA supporters was the same.2
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court flatly rejected a formalistic
approach to determining the Constitution’s reach, and instead approached
the question functionally. “Guantanamo . . . is no transient possession. In
every practical sense, Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant
jurisdiction of the United States.” 128 S. Ct. at 2261 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The Suspension Clause explicitly limits suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus to times of “rebellion or invasion.”3 Given the
historical importance of habeas corpus as a linchpin of liberty, the Court
asked whether it was “impractical or anomalous” for this Constitutional
2

See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 36 (statement of Sen. Sessions) (July 2006) (“But all the provisions that are
engrafted in the United States Code, State law, and Federal constitutional privileges are not required in
military commissions. They never have been.”) (on file with the S. Comm. on the Judiciary); 152 CONG.
REC. S10243, 10273 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (stating that Guantanamo Bay
detainees do not have constitutional rights); 152 CONG. REC. S10243, 10263 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006)
(remarks of Sen. Warner & Sen. Levin); Legal Issues Regarding Individuals Detained by the Department of
Defense as Unlawful Enemy Combatants: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong.
94 (2007) (testimony of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, Department of Defense) (“If
we talk about, now, moving [military commissions] to the United States, I think then you bump up against
the legal aspect, and that is, are we going to have the full panoply of constitutional protections for those
individuals, by virtue of their presence on U.S. soil?”).
3
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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protection to extend beyond the nation’s traditional borders.4 Deciding that
it was neither, the Court concluded that Section 7 of the MCA, which
attempted to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, was therefore
unconstitutional. Judicial enforcement of the Suspension Clause in an area
where the U.S. had complete jurisdiction and control, which was not in an
active theater of war, and where there was no threat of friction with a host
government was neither “impractical” nor “anomalous.”5 “[N]o law other
than the laws of the United States applies at the naval station.” 128 S. Ct. at
2251. “The United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control
of the bay for over 100 years.” Id. at 2258.
The Court’s logic and analysis regarding habeas corpus and detention
under the MCA apply with equal force to the military commissions also
established by the MCA. The structure and procedures of these commissions
clearly transgress structural limits on the powers of the U.S. government and
violate fundamental constitutional guarantees. In invalidating part of the
MCA, the Boumediene Court was unequivocal. It reminded Congress that:
“Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not
‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed
in the Constitution.’”6 In short, Boumediene confirmed what we already
knew: Congress cannot switch the Constitution on and off as it pleases.
“Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.”7 To paraphrase
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, it is emphatically the duty
and province of the Courts to say what the law is. To hold otherwise—to let
the political branches decide where and when the Constitution applies to
catch the prevailing winds of the hour—would undermine foundational
principles of separation of powers that define our system of government.
It is incorrect to believe that this principle applies only to the
Suspension Clause. After all, habeas corpus exists to protect “the rights of
the detained by a means consistent with the essential design of the
Constitution.”8 Boumediene’s right to habeas corpus would be meaningless
if there were no substantive rights to protect.
Given the myriad
4

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.
Id. at 2261.
6
Id. at 2259 (quotation omitted).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 2247.
5
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constitutional defects inherent in the military commissions established under
the MCA, Congress should consider itself on notice that the entirety of that
system now rests on a crumbling foundation. In light of the serious national
security concerns at stake, Congress should be proactive and act carefully
rather than let the current system fall apart, piece-by-piece. It is worth
bearing in mind that letting the system fall apart will have a number of other
terrible consequences, including possibly having convictions reversed and
individuals unable to be retried.
The second invalid assumption of the MCA was that the treaties of the
United States, most notably the Geneva Conventions, have no effect at
Guantanamo. It is frequently said that treaties are agreements between
nations, and that courts have no business enforcing a treaty’s guarantees.
This is true in some circumstances, but generally speaking, the Supremacy
Clause mandates that “treaties” are part of “the supreme law of the land.”9
Moreover, the Supreme Court already demonstrated in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
that it would invalidate a military commission system that violated the laws
of war and the Geneva Conventions.10 Yet the existing system under the
MCA is fatally deficient. It not only violates the Constitution, but also
various treaties of the U.S., including Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which guarantees a set of minimum rights for all combatants.
In multiple places, the MCA seeks to limit the ability to invoke the
Geneva Conventions as a “source of rights.”11 This appears to be a
statement of Congress’s belief that the Geneva Conventions provide no
independently enforceable rights, or do not create a private right of action in
certain situations. Such an assertion is constitutionally dubious. Principles
of separation of powers prevent Congress from enacting a statute that
requires federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction “in a manner repugnant
to the text, structure, and traditions of Article III.”12 A quintessential
example of such an invalid statute is one that “prescribe[s] rules of decision
to the Judicial Department.”13 The MCA does not diminish or alter the
United States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Instead, it
9

U.S. Const. art. VI.
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
11
See MCA Section 3 (specifically 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)) and MCA Section 5.
12
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995).
13
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 136 (1872).
10
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reinforces their applicability to the military commissions it created.14 To the
extent the MCA seeks to prevent federal courts from considering federal law
in certain situations, it creates exactly this serious constitutional problem.
More specifically, “Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the courts, but it
cannot give them jurisdiction and instruct them to decide the case without
regard to applicable federal law.”15
Boumediene’s holding that detainees at Guantanamo have a right to
habeas corpus further undermines this second assumption.
Courts
historically have granted habeas relief for treaty violations, even when a
treaty does not itself confer individually enforceable rights.16 In such cases,
the treaty itself does not create the right of action or remedy for its
violation—habeas does. Despite assertions to the contrary in the statute
itself, military commissions under the MCA do not comport with the Geneva
Conventions.17 Accordingly, a court easily could find that trial by such a
military commission is unlawful, just as the Supreme Court did two years
ago in Hamdan. If that happened, Congress would be forced to go back to
the drawing board and rethink its system for dealing with detainees at
Guantanamo.
The Military Commissions Act Is Unconstitutional
The only way to solve the multiple problems created by the MCA is
to repeal the entire law and pass one consistent with this nation’s
Constitution and principles. As it stands, the MCA discriminates against
people on the basis of alienage, a violation of Equal Protection principles
that are deeply ingrained in both legal doctrine and our American narrative.
And in further contravention of the basic guarantees of a free society, the
14

Section 3 of the MCA (10 U.S.C. § 948b(f)) states that a military commission established under the
MCA satisfies the requirements of Common Article 3, reaffirming the relevance and applicability of the
Geneva Conventions in this context.
15
Carlos M. Vazquez, The Military Commissions Act, The Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical
Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 86 (2007).
16
See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536
(1884).
17
These arguments are analyzed in detail in two briefs filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
Hamdan v. Gates, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/hamdan-replyon-inj-7-16-08.pdf; Amicus Brief of United Kingdom and European Union Parliamentarians, Hamdan v.
Gates, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/parliamentarians-briefhamdan-7-08.pdf.

6

law burdens the fundamental right of access to the courts. The commissions
sanctioned by the MCA also flout international law and dispense with many
of the procedures fundamental to the fair administration of justice, including
the prohibition on hearsay evidence. To solve these infirmities, Congress
should repeal the MCA and pass a law, such as the Restoring the
Constitution Act, that uses an existing, constitutionally-sound system of
courts or courts-martial to deal with the Guantánamo detainees.
There are many constitutional problems with the MCA (to mention
just a few of the most glaring ones, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause,
Suspension Clause, Define & Punish Clause, Bill of Attainder Clause, and
Due Process Clause). For the sake of brevity, I will focus on just one: Equal
Protection. The Equal Protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments preclude both the restriction of fundamental rights and,
independently, government discrimination against a protected class unless
the law in question passes strict scrutiny review. The MCA targets both a
fundamental right and a protected class, and as such it simply cannot survive
the stringent constitutional standard. The statute purports to restrict the right
of equal access to the courts, one of the most fundamental of rights under
our legal system. Worse still, the line that divides those who do and do not
receive full habeas review under the MCA is based on a patently
unconstitutional distinction—alienage. The onus is on this Congress and
this Committee to recognize that we can no longer tolerate this
unconstitutional deviation from longstanding American law in the current
war on terror.
The commissions set up by the MCA, like President Bush’s first
attempt to set up a system of military commissions, appear to be the first
ones in American history designed to apply only to foreigners. The United
States first employed military commissions in the Mexican-American war,
where “a majority of the persons tried . . . were American citizens.”18 The
tribunals in the Civil War naturally applied to citizens as well. And in Ex
parte Quirin, President Roosevelt utilized the tribunals symmetrically for the
saboteur who claimed to be an American citizen as well as for others who
were indisputably German nationals, prompting the Supreme Court to hold:
18

David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military
Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2030 (2005).
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“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in
violation of the law of war.”19
Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause knew all too well that
discrimination against non-citizens must be constitutionally prohibited. The
Clause’s text itself reflects this principle; unlike other parts of the Section,
which provide privileges and immunities to “citizens,” the drafters
intentionally extended equal protection to all “persons.”20 Foremost in their
minds was the language of Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had limited due
process guarantees by framing them as nothing more than the “privileges of
the citizen.”21 This language was repeatedly mentioned in the Senate
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, with the very first draft of the
Amendment distinguishing between persons and citizens: “Congress shall
have power to . . . secure to all citizens . . . the same political rights and
privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”22 The Amendment’s principal
author, Representative John Bingham, asked: “Is it not essential to the unity
of the people that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential
. . . that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have
equal protection . . . ?”23
Moreover, drawing lines based on alienage offends all logic and
sound policy judgment for effectively fighting the war on terror. Our
country understands all too well that the kind of hatred and evil that leads to
the massacre of innocent civilians is born both at home and abroad. And
19

Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
388-89 (2005) (providing evidence that the Equal Protection Clause was intentionally written as it was
specifically in order to extend certain rights to aliens); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1442-47 (1992) (same).
21
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449 (1857). See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 170-72 (1998) (tracing the historical origins of the Equal
Protection Clause and its use of the word “persons” to Dred Scott); id. at 217-18 n.* (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause is “paradigmatically” concerned with “nonvoting aliens”).
22
AMAR, supra, at 173 (quoting a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). Similarly, Senator Howard stated that the Amendment
was necessary to “disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the
equal protection of the laws of the State.” Id. at 2766.
20
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nothing in the MCA, nor the DTA or the Military Order that preceded it,
suggests that military commissions are more necessary for aliens than for
citizens suspected of terrorist activities. Indeed, both the Executive and
Congress appear to believe that citizens and non-citizens pose an equal
threat in the War on Terror. Since the attacks of September 11th, the
Executive has argued for presidential authority to detain and prosecute U.S.
citizens. And in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court agreed that “[a]
citizen, no less than an alien, can be ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to
the United States or coalition partners’ and ‘engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States.’ . . . [S]uch a citizen, if released, would pose the
same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.”24
Likewise, this body did not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens in
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution, which provided
the President with the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001.”25
The threat of terrorism knows no nationality; rather, it is a global
plague, and its perpetrators must be brought to justice no matter what their
country of origin. Terrorism does not discriminate in choosing its disciples
and neither should we in punishing those who employ this perfidious and
cowardly tactic. If anything, we can expect organizations such as al Qaeda
to select, wherever possible, American citizens to carry out their despicable
bidding. Former Attorney General Gonzales stated that “[t]he threat of
homegrown terrorist cells . . . may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda,
if not more so.”26 Given this sensible recognition by all three branches of
government that the terrorist threat is not limited to non-citizens, the

24

504 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U.S.C. §1541.
26
Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh on
Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006),
transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html; see also Foiled
Dirty-Bomb Plot Reveals Chilling New Threats, USA TODAY, June 11, 2002, at 10A (reporting that when
announcing Jose Padilla’s arrest in 2002 for suspicion of planning a dirty bomb attack on U.S. soil,
Attorney General John Ashcroft described Padilla’s American citizenship as attractive to al Qaeda because
Padilla could move freely and easily within the United States); Jessica Stern, Op-Ed., Al Qaeda, American
Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A15 (expressing concern that al Qaeda is aiming to recruit American
citizens for domestic terror attacks).
25
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disparate procedures for suspected terrorist detainees on the basis of
citizenship simply make no sense.
Further, in the wake of international disdain for and suspicion of the
military tribunals authorized by President Bush in his Military Order, our
country is already under global scrutiny for its disparate treatment of nonU.S. citizens. A letter signed by dozens of former diplomats that was sent to
you attests that it is critical to remove this credibility gap: “To proclaim
democratic government to the rest of the world as the supreme form of
government at the very moment we eliminate the most important avenue of
relief from arbitrary governmental detention will not serve our interests in
the larger world.”27 This asymmetry will not go unnoticed.
We must be careful not to further the perception that, in matters of
justice, the American government adopts special rules that single out
foreigners for disfavor. If American citizens get a “Cadillac” version of
justice, and everyone else gets a “beat-up Chevy,” the result will be fewer
extraditions, more international condemnation, and increased enmity
towards America worldwide.
The Military Commissions Cannot Substitute for the Great Writ
To the extent this Congress considers legislation related to the
detainees, a core purpose of any Bill should be to clarify that criminal
prosecution before a military commission cannot be a substitute for, or
barrier to, a timely federal habeas hearing. This would seem to be an
unremarkable and obvious point—military commission prosecutions and
habeas review of detentions serve two vastly different purposes. But the
Bush Administration has indicated that it may view criminally charging the
detainees before military commissions as a vehicle to escape the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Boumediene that the Constitution requires the
detainees be granted proper and timely habeas hearings. Although only a
fraction of the Guantanamo detainees have been criminally charged at this
point, if the Administration’s theory were successful, it could charge a great
number of the detainees in an effort to forestall, or foreclose altogether, their
rights to habeas hearings.
27

Letter from William D. Rogers et al. to Members of Congress, Sept. 25, 2006.
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To avoid this sort of run-around, any legislation should clarify that
whether or not a detainee is prosecuted by a military commission has no
bearing on his right to a timely and meaningful habeas hearing to challenge
the legality of his ongoing Executive detention. In the rest of this Section of
my testimony I will first explain the legal background behind this particular
issue and explain why a military commission cannot and should not be a
habeas replacement.
Military commissions allow for the prosecution and sentencing of
individuals who are unlawful enemy combatants and have committed war
crimes. Habeas hearings allow an individual who is detained to challenge
the President’s authority to detain him, and the legality of the ongoing
detention. Although prosecution by military commission and review of the
legality of executive detention are entirely different proceedings which serve
wholly different functions, the Bush Administration has indicated that it
views prosecution before a military commission as a substitute to a habeas
hearing.28
To begin, there is no doubt that individuals detained at Guantanamo
Bay all have the same right to habeas corpus, whether or not they are to be
tried by military commission. The Administration itself conceded this point,
at an earlier stage of the litigation involving Mr. Hamdan, when it stated to
the Supreme Court that: “If th[e] Court holds in Boumediene and Al Odah
that enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may petition for habeas corpus
to challenge their detention notwithstanding the MCA, there is no reason to
suppose that its holding would not apply to those enemy combatants who
have been designated for trial by military commission.”29
Under longstanding Supreme Court doctrine, as reaffirmed in
Boumediene, unless Congress formally suspends the writ, it can only remove
28

See, e.g., Gov’t Br. in Opp’n to Pet’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 20 (July 14, 2008), Hamdan v.
Gates, No. 04-CV-1519-JR (D.D.C.) (asserting that habeas review into Hamdan’s designation as an enemy
combatant is not necessary because the commissions themselves, “in conjunction with review by [the D.C.
Circuit], certainly comprise a sufficient habeas substitute. . . .”).
29
Br. in Opp’n to Cert., Hamdan v. Gates, No. 07-15, at 12; see also id. at 10 (“[t]he jurisdictional
provision of the MCA makes no distinction between aliens detained as enemy combatants and those who
are also subject to trial by military commission, see MCA § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2636, and petitioner provides no
reason why any decision of this Court in Boumediene and Al Odah would not apply to him.”).
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jurisdiction over habeas petitions from federal courts if it provides an
adequate alternative or substitute process.30 The Supreme Court held in
Boumediene that a CSRT conducted by the military, and the limited review
provided by the DTA, are not adequate alternatives to the writ of habeas
corpus guaranteed in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.31
There are at least five reasons why trial by a military commission is
no substitute for a detainee’s right to a timely habeas hearing to challenge
his ongoing Executive detention.
First, and most significantly, any habeas hearing to challenge the
legality of a detention must have, as a possible outcome, the detainee’s
ultimate release from unlawful detention. This is the very purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus. But the military commission process does not
contemplate or permit this result. Even if a military commission proceeding
results in an acquittal,32 or a conviction is ultimately overturned, the
detainee’s captivity continues.33 There is simply no mechanism in a military
commission or the D.C. Circuit review of a commission that is prescribed by
the MCA to end unlawful Executive detention.
Second, military commissions and habeas hearings serve entirely
different purposes. The purpose of the constitutional habeas hearing
recognized in Boumediene is to determine whether the President has
authority to hold an individual as an enemy combatant. The purpose of a
military commission is to criminally prosecute an individual for violating the
laws of war. One foundational aspect of the laws of war is that certain
people are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) or combatant immunity, and so
cannot be criminally prosecuted for their participation in hostilities. Thus,
30

See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (questioning “whether the statute stripping jurisdiction to issue the
writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures
for habeas corpus” and finding the substitute to be inadequate).
31
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 (“[T]he DTA review process is, on its face, an inadequate substitute
for habeas corpus.”).
32
I would note, also, the statement of my distinguished co-panelist today, the former Chief Prosecutor of
the Military Commissions, Col. Mo Davis. See Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor To Critic at
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2008, at A1 (quoting former Chief Prosecutor Col. Morris Davis
recalling the Defense Department General Counsel stating “‘We’ve been holding these guys for years. How
can we explain acquittals? We have to have convictions.’”).
33
See Jeffrey Toobin, Camp Justice; Everyone Wants to Close Guantanamo, but What Will Happen to the
Detainees?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 2008, at 32.
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one of the few defenses available to a defendant before a military
commission is to argue that he is a lawful combatant and so cannot be tried.
But, requiring a defendant in a military commission to argue that he is a
lawful combatant entitled to POW status would force him to argue directly
against his interests in a habeas hearing, where the detainee would wish to
argue he is not a combatant at all. In sum, because a military commission is
engaged in a fundamentally different inquiry than a habeas court, a
commission will not hear the proper arguments to evaluate the legality of a
defendant’s detention. By design, the commission cannot possibly substitute
for the habeas hearing.
Third, the procedures used by a military commission may be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Boumediene on the
requisite elements of a proper habeas hearing. For example, the commission
permits the admission into evidence of testimony extracted by coercion.34
So too, hearsay is readily admissible in commission proceedings, gravely
undermining the right of confrontation.35 In addition, the commission has
already ruled that the sharply curtailed right against self-incrimination
afforded to defendants under the MCA “is at odds with the balance of
American jurisprudence.”36 And as I said earlier, military commission
defendants are stripped of any right to invoke the Geneva Conventions,
which are crucial in determining whether an individual may be detained as
an enemy combatant.37 These are just some of the reasons why a military
commission proceeding lacks the proper procedures for a habeas hearing. It
is for these reasons, moreover, that a military commission’s own
jurisdictional decision about whether a detainee is a so-called “unlawful
enemy combatant” is likewise insufficient as a habeas substitute.
Fourth, the D.C. Circuit review of the final judgment of a military
commission that is provided by the MCA is far more restricted than the
review of CSRTs provided by the DTA—which the Supreme Court in
Boumediene has already found an inadequate habeas substitute.38 Most
significantly, unlike the DTA-provided review of CSRTs, the MCA does not
34

See 10 U.S.C. § 948r.
See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E).
36
See Ruling on Motion to Suppress (D-030) at 3, United States v. Hamdan.
37
See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g).
38
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263–69.
35
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permit any review of the factual findings and determinations of the military
commission. When reviewing a military commission, “the Court of Appeals
may act only with respect to matters of law.”39 By contrast, the DTA
requires judicial review of facts for challenges to CSRTs.40 So, too, the
MCA has a more restrictive provision than the DTA for the D.C. Circuit to
look to the “Constitution and the laws of the United States.”41 Given that the
Supreme Court has already found the DTA federal review provisions to be
inadequate, it goes without saying that these inferior provisions in the MCA
cannot suffice as a habeas substitute.
Fifth, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Boumediene, the writ of
habeas corpus commands timely access to a hearing to review the factual
and legal basis of the ongoing Executive detention. Many of the detainees
have already been held in captivity at Guantanamo Bay and denied a habeas
hearing for nearly seven years.42 Given that the delay up to this point
already conflicts with the core concept of habeas, a further delay to await the
conclusion of military commission trials and review would be deeply
problematic. Indeed, the military commissions have already demonstrated
that they are incapable of a speedy trial, and the MCA places no time limit
on when a military commission judgment must be finalized, raising the
specter that they could be drawn out indefinitely to prevent detainees from
ever getting a day in court. The near certainty of lengthy additional delay is
thus another reason not to view military commission proceedings as a habeas
substitute.
For these reasons, a criminal trial before a military commission should
not be considered to serve as a substitute to a detainee’s right to challenge
the legality of his detention in a federal habeas proceeding. Given the Bush
Administration’s indication that it may view military commissions as a

39

10 U.S.C. § 950g(b).
See DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i) (with respect to CSRTs the D.C. Circuit must ensure “that the conclusion of
the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence”).
41
Compare the MCA provision on this point, 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c), with the DTA provision, DTA §
1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743.
42
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263 (“[T]he fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access
to a judicial forum for a period of years render these cases exceptional.”); see also id. at 2275 (that waiting
for the D.C. Circuit to address the sufficiency of DTA review “would be to require additional months, if not
years, of delay”).
40
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habeas substitute, Congress should consider explicitly making this point
clear in any legislation.
Next Steps: A National Security Court?
Moving forward, perhaps the most important line in last month’s
Boumediene opinion belonged to Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent: After the
Supreme Court in 2004 gave Guantanamo detainees the right to habeas
corpus, “Congress responded 18 months later . . . [and] cannot be faulted for
taking that time to consider how best to accommodate both the detainees’
interests and the need to keep the American people safe.” 128 S. Ct. at 2282
n.1.
Some are ignoring the Chief’s wise words and calling immediately for
legislation to create a national security court as a response to the
Boumediene decision. I support a security court. But the litany of policy
questions that surround it are far too massive to be tackled in the next few
months, right before a presidential election. Rushing ahead is a huge
mistake that will weaken American security.
The current system of detention is totally broken. The current
Administration has been asserting an open-ended power to detain people
forever with little or no serious process. The result of its system not only
has been that the truly innocent could potentially be detained forever, but
also that the seriously guilty could call themselves mere shepherds and
escape the consequences of criminal conviction. The Supreme Court wisely
shut that system down. Now, what is needed is a serious plan to prosecute
everyone we can in regular courts, and a separate system to deal with the
small handful of cases in which patently dangerous people cannot be tried.
That’s where a national security court could come in—a system that
would be staffed by federal judges, with experienced counsel on both sides,
in which the government would have an ability to temporarily detain a
dangerous individual. It might only come into being after a criminal trial
has failed. Or it might be limited in other ways—from a numerical cap on
the number of detainees in the system to innovative ideas such as forcing the
government to give an escalating amount of money in foreign aid to the
country of origin of each detainee for every additional month of detention.
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Every aspect of the system is up for grabs—from the rules of evidence to the
length of an initial detention period and what an appeals system would look
like. The point here is simply that there are literally hundreds of different
models from which to choose.
And yet each of those models will differ from our traditional system
of justice. Americans take pride in our criminal trial system—and our
system works best when we convict terrorists in our court system. We
showcase the rule of law—and contrast it with the despicable world of the
enemy, who lacks respect for our way of life and our values. If we are to
modify our system, even in the slightest of ways, we should do so
cautiously, with appreciation for the risks involved.
The very worst time to contemplate such changes is a few months
before a major election (and particularly when both presidential candidates
have announced that they will change policy and close Guantanamo). A
rush to judgment produces sloganeering without a sustainable product.
Consider what happened before the last election: The Supreme Court struck
down President Bush’s Guantanamo trial system and Geneva Convention
policies in June of 2006, and the Congress fast-tracked new legislation to try
to overturn the Supreme Court three months later in the form of the MCA.
Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle warned that this legislation
was unconstitutional and would be struck down by the courts. But the
Administration did not listen. And so here we are again, nearly seven years
after the horrible 9-11 attacks with only half of a single trial completed at
Guantanamo Bay, and that very law, the MCA, already struck down in part
by the Supreme Court.
We need a better plan than simply looking tough if we want to
demonstrate to our courts and the world that we are serious about terrorism.
This country desperately needs, and deserves, a serious inquiry, perhaps
catalyzed by a bipartisan national commission, to examine whether a
national security court is necessary and, if so, what it should look like.
We have spent far too many years with intemperate solutions that
have gotten us nowhere. Many warned the Administration that it needed a
plan for the day after the Supreme Court’s highly predictable decision to
restore basic rights to the Guantanamo detainees—but it stubbornly clung to
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notions of executive power that the Supreme Court in Boumediene
eviscerated. If we rush into a national security court, we will need another
plan for the next predictable “day after.”
Conclusion
In light of the rampant constitutional and treaty-based defects that
infect the entire military commission system established by the MCA, I am
grateful for the attention that this Committee, and the Congress as a whole,
is expending on this matter. I am pleased to answer any questions that you
might have.

17

